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Abstract 
 
One of the major problems in the Nile basin with respect to the utilization and 
management of the water is to strike a balance between patting the water in a reasonable 
manner and causing no significant harm to the existing uses. To date, the Nile basin states 
could not, however, forge a comprehensive legal framework to resolve the problem. 
Since there are no sound rules and principles, which govern water allocation and 
management, acceptable to all the riparian states at present, one may resort to the UN 
Watercourses Convention- the only global Convention in place that governs the 
utilization, management, and development of shared water resources for non-navigational 
purposes. The article aims at probing the relevance and contribution of the Convention 
toward crafting cooperative arrangement and thereby reversing the current patterns of the 
utilization and management of the waters of the Nile, which is iniquitous. In spite of the 
fact that most of the Nile basin states present during the session of the General Assembly 
for the adoption of the Convention abstained from voting in favor of it, it is concluded 
that the Convention is relevant to the Nile basin and incorporates important principles 
and rules that could help address the problems in the basin. It is also held that it provides 
the Nile basin states with appropriate legal framework that could be used as the basis for 
negotiation as to how to use, manage, and develop the resources of the basin to the 
benefit of all riparian states. 
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Introduction 
  
The Convention came in to being as the result of the codification efforts undertaken by 
the ILC (the International Law Commission) for close to 25 years. The UN instructed the 
ILC to launch a treatise study on international watercourses with a view to its progressive 
development and codification in 1970. Following a series of works, the UN General 
Assembly adopted the final text of the Convention in 1997. The Convention deals mainly 
with the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. The goals of the 
Convention, espoused under its preamble, are to ensure the utilization, development, 
conservation, management, and protection of international watercourses, and the 
promotion of their optional and sustainable utilization for the present and future 
generations. 
  
The Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
(hereinafter referred to as the UN Watercourses Convention) is the only Convention 
adopted at international scene to govern the uses of international watercourses for the 
purposes other than navigation. Prior to it, the international community did not have a set 
of rules codified at inter state level. 
 
There were seven Nile basin states that took part in the session held for the adoption of 
the Convention by the UN General Assembly. Four of them abstained- Ethiopia, Egypt, 
Rwanda, and Tanzania. Two of them, Kenya and Sudan, voted in favor. Burundi opposed 
it. Uganda, DRC and Eritrea were absent. Given this voting of the Nile Basin states, one 
wonders whether the Convention is of relevance to the Nile Basin and contributes toward 
resolving the predicament in the basin. The article begins with the reaction of the Nile 
basin states to the Convention before and at the time it was adopted and the reasons for 
such reply. It identifies some factors showing the relevance and contribution of the 
Convention toward attempts at cooperative scheme in the Nile basin. It finally considers 
the impact of the terms of the Convention on the Nile Basin Initiative. 
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1. Reaction of the Nile Basin States to the Convention 
 
The International Law Commission adopted, in 1994, on second reading, the draft of the 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses and 
recommended the elaboration of the draft convention by the General Assembly or an 
international conference.1 Accordingly, the General Assembly considered the Report of 
the International Law Commission, its draft convention and commentaries thereto. As per 
the recommendation of the ILC, the General Assembly invited states to submit written 
comments and observations on the draft articles of the convention. It also designated the 
Sixth Committee to convene as a Working Group of the Whole to elaborate the draft 
convention in light of the written comments and observations of states and views 
expressed in the debate of the Forty Ninth Session of the Assembly.2
 
The reaction of the Nile basin states to the Convention can be gathered from the 
comments and observations they submitted to the General Assembly before the Working 
Group convened to elaborate the Convention, the proposals they submitted to the 
Working Group and voting they cast at the end of the Second Session of the Working 
Group, and the statements they made at the voting for the adoption of the final text of the 
Convention at the General Assembly. 
 
Ethiopia and the Sudan were among the Nile basin states that submitted written 
comments and observations on the draft convention adopted by the ILC on second 
reading.3   The comments of Ethiopia and Sudan focused mainly on Articles 3, 5, 6, and 7 
of the draft convention. 
 
Ethiopia, Egypt and the Sudan were among the Nile basin states that submitted proposals 
to the Working Group in relation to different articles of the draft convention.4 The 
proposals of Ethiopia, Egypt and the Sudan were especially in relation to Articles 3, 5, 6, 
and 7 of the draft convention. 
 
The Working Group held two separate sessions. The first one was from 7-25 October 
1996 and the second was from 24 March-4 April 1997.  
 
At the first session of the Working Group, many contentious issues were raised by states. 
At the heart of the deliberations were issues relating to the identification of the 
substantive rules that should determine the rights and duties watercourse states, factors to 
be considered in the determination of reasonable and equitable utilization, relationships 
between reasonable and equitable utilization and no harm, rules in the event of conflicts 
of uses, and the fate of existing watercourse agreements5. 
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When one looks at the both the written comments and observations and proposals of the 
Nile Basin states (Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan), one can see that the core controversial 
issues at the first session of the Working Group hold true also for the Nile Basin states as 
their main concerns were with respect to Articles 3, 5, 6, and 7 of the draft convention, 
which deal with the existing watercourse agreements, reasonable and equitable 
utilization, factors that determine reasonable and equitable utilization ,and no harm 
respectively. 
 
The First Meeting of the Working Group failed to produce agreement on core issues. 
Hence, the Second Meeting was found to be of necessity.  Thus, the Second Meeting was 
held from 24 March-4 April 1997. At the second meeting three central issues emerged as 
the focal points of disagreement among states, which include the status of existing 
watercourse agreement under the Convention and the effect of the Convention on future 
watercourse agreement, the substantive rules provided by Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the 1994 
draft convention adopted by the ILC on second reading and the relationship between 
them and the rules that govern dispute settlement.6
 
The states that showed discrepancy on the fate of the existing watercourse agreement 
included both the upper riparian states and lower riparian states and such disparity was 
not conditioned by geographical contemplation but rather by the question of who was 
well-served by the existing agreement.7 The controversy on the relationship between the 
substantive rules of articles 5,6 and 7 was based on the doctrines adopted by states 
concerning the utilization of shared water, which are the doctrine of absolute territorial 
sovereignty and the doctrine of absolute territorial integrity(prior appropriation). 8
 
Since the positions of states concerning the aforementioned core issues were found to be 
irreconcilable, the working Group introduced modification to articles 3, 6, 7, 10, etc of 
the draft convention adopted by the ILC in 1994 .9 After the modification, three voting 
were made on Articles 3, 5, 6,7, and 33 and finally the whole text of the convention was 
presented for voting10. 
 
36 states (including the Sudan and Egypt) voted in favor of the modified version of 
Artilce 3, 3 states(Including Ethiopia) voted against it, and 21 states(Including Rwanda 
and Tanzania) abstained.11 It was in order to bring together the incongruent views of 
states toward the fate of the existing watercourse agreement that Article 3(1), as modified 
by the Working Group, maintained the position of those states that want to see such 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bank, Technical Paper. No. 414, the World Bank, Washington, DC, 1998 p. 9. See also  Charles B. 
Bourne, “The Current Status of International Water Law”, in Wouters eds., International Water Law: 
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6 . Bourne, supra note no. 5, pp. 10-11 
7.  Caflish, supra note 5, p. 10 
8 . Bourne, supra note no. 5, p.11 
9 . Caflish supra note no. 5, p. 10 
10 . UN Doc. A/51/869, 1997 
11 . UN Doc.C.6/51/NUW/L.4/ADI, 1997 
agreements unaffected and that Article 3(2) was inserted as a concession to those that 
want to get them replaced by the Convention.12 Thus, the spirit of the Convention is 
against the argument offered by Ethiopia that the Convention should replace existing 
watercourse agreements.13
  
Another core issue set aside for voting, on package basis, at the end of the Second 
Session of the Working Group was the substantive rules under Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the 
draft convention and the relationships between them. 38 states(None of the Nile Basin 
sates) voted in favor; 4 states(including Tanzania) opposed ; and 22 states(including 
Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Sudan) abstained.14
 
The alteration introduced to Articles 5 and 7 of the original draft submitted by the ILC 
put in place compromising formula and contain something for everyone.15 Regardless of 
whether one is from the equitable utilization or no harm school, one can claim partial 
victory.16  The modified version of Articles 5 and 7 put both the reasonable and equitable 
use on par with no harm and no priority is set between them in event of conflicts of uses 
of shared water resources. Thus, the rules favored neither upper nor lower riparian 
states.17  This is against the position of some Nile riparian states, for instance, Ethiopia, 
which held that basic consideration should be given to the reasonable and equitable 
utilization in relation to harm and that significant harm should be subordinated to it.18 
Egypt held, contrary to Ethiopia’s position, that the governing  rule concerning utilization 
of shared water resources is the rule of no harm.19
 
When the whole text of the Convention was put for voting at the end of the Second 
Session of the Working Group, 42 states(including Ethiopia and Sudan) voted in favor; 3 
states(none of the Nile basin states present) opposed its adoption; and 18 states(including 
Egypt, Rwanda and Tanzania) abstained.20 It seems a paradox that Ethiopia that 
abstained during the voting on Articles 5, 6, and 7; that voted against Article 3 and that 
abstained during the voting on Article 33 finally voted in favor of the entire text of the 
convention.21
 
One can also see the reaction of the Nile basin states during the voting made at the 
meeting of the General Assembly for the adoption of the final text of the Convention 
submitted to the Assembly by the Working Group. Ethiopia, Egypt and Rwanda were 
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among the Nile basis states that made their reflections toward the Convention. The 
statements made by them revolved mainly around Articles 3, 5, 6, and 7 of the 
Convention adopted by the Working Group.22
 
The final version of the Convention was adopted by the General Assembly by 103 votes 
in favor(including Sudan and Kenya); 27 states(including Ethiopia, Egypt, Rwanda and 
Tanzania); and 3 states(including Burundi) opposed it. 
  
In a nutshell, at the heart of reaction of the Nile basin states to the Convention one finds 
important considerations such as the fate of existing agreement with respect to the water 
of the Nile and the substantive rules of reasonable and equitable use on the one hand and 
the no harm rule on the other and the relationships between them. It is the status quo put 
in place by the regimes on the Nile, concluded at both the colonial and postcolonial 
periods, which determined the reaction of the Nile basin states toward the Convention. 
For instance, the 1959 Agreement concluded between Egypt and Sudan divided the entire 
water of the Nile to the two states only. Ethiopia and other upper riparian states are of the 
opinion that such agreement is unfair, that it is valid between the two countries only, and 
that they need to harness the water in a fair and rational manner.  On the other side, Egypt 
wants to maintain control over the water of the Nile and alleges that the Agreement binds 
other riparian states as well. Hence, the issues of fair allocation of water and of the 
existing agreement disclose the Nile basin states response to the Convention. It suffices to 
look at the statements made by Ethiopia and Egypt at the time of adoption of the final 
text of the Convention by the General Assembly. Ethiopia abstained from voting by 
alleging that the Convention was not balanced since Article 7 and Part III of the 
Convention put an onerous burden on upper riparian states and this makes the 
Convention to tilt toward the lower riparian states.23 Ethiopia also held that it is specific 
watercourse agreements that should be adjusted to the Convention and not the vice 
versa.24  Egypt’s Representative at the time of the adoption of the Convention, Lamia A. 
Mekhemar, said that the Convention should not affect bilateral or regional agreements 
and that the application of the terms of the Convention should take into account existing 
agreements and customary uses.25 Thus, the status quo in the Nile basin as maintained by 
the 1959 Agreement shows the fundamental consideration behind, for instance, 
Ethiopia’s and Egypt’s reply to the Convention, as evident in the statements made by the 
representatives of the two countries at the adoption of the Convention. 
 
 2.The Relevance and Contribution of the Convention toward Resolving the 
Problems in the Nile basin  
 
One wonders whether the Convention is relevant to settle issues related to the Nile basin, 
given the fact that most of its riparian states present at the adoption of the Convention at 
the General Assembly session abstained during the voting process for the adoption of the 
Convention. Four Nile basin states- Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Egypt- desisted 
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23 . Ibid 
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from voting in favor of the Convention. Burundi voted against it. Kenya and Sudan voted 
in favor of it. In fact, this is not only true for the Nile basin states but also true for the 
other shared water resources. Watercourse states of the world’s major international 
watercourses that are particularly subject to disputes did not favor the Convention. 26 
What immediately conjures up in one’s mind by examining this voting pattern is whether 
or not the Convention is relevant for and applies to the Nile basin at all and contributes 
toward resolving problems prevalent in the Nile basin.  
 
The overall voting result, the influence of its draft and the adopted text, reference made to 
it by the International Court of Justice, absence of framework agreement incorporating all 
Nile basin states, provision of rules and principles that serves as the plinth of negotiation 
in the Nile Basin, and nature of the Convention, and application of some of the provisions 
of the Convention to the Nile basin are among main factors that one needs to consider in 
order to determine the relevance of the Convention and its contribution toward resolving 
the problems in the Nile basin.  
  
Voting Results in the Adoption of the Convention 
  
Prior to 1997 the international community did not have a set of rules and principles, 
which are adopted at inter state level, governing issues and problems arising from 
international waters. Considering the roles played by international waters in international 
relations, given the fact that 40 % of the world population relies on shared waters, the 
international community commissioned a codification of rules in this respect under the 
aegis of the UN and the efforts culminated in the adoption of the Convention.27  
 
The Convention was adopted by 103 states, out of 135 states that were present during its 
adoption, 27 states refrained from voting and three states opposed it.  It was adopted, 
hence, by a wide margin and this manifests that it could serve as a standard for state 
practice relating to shared water resources. Irrespective of the politics and national 
interests involved in the voting process, the passage of the Convention by such vote 
indicates that there is a broad agreement in the international community on at least the 
basic principles that are incorporated in it and that govern international watercourses.28
  
The manner in which it was adopted itself marks a success story, for it achieved 
universality. It attracted the support of the majority states despite controversies over some 
key issues and this manifests the will of the international community to be governed by 
the rules and principles of the Convention. The weight of the growing consensus of the 
international community, which was manifested in how it was adopted, carries persuasive 
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27 .  Sandra Postel,  “The Politics of Water”. In Charles, W.K. and Eugene, R.W. (eds.), The Global 
Agenda. McGraw Hill Inc., 1995, p. 403 
28 . Eckstein, supra note no. 26, p. 88; see also McCAffrey, supra note no. 12, p. 261 
force in its application for states that voted against it or who abstained.29  It contains 
something everyone could live with, as held by Stephen McCaffrey. It provides rules and 
principles, of international water resources, that could settle the problems of all the 
riparian states in a particular basin, regardless of their geographical location. It, thus, 
plays an important role in the management of international waters by serving as an 
authoritative statement of relevant international law. This is because it is an instrument 
whose primary purpose is to facilitate basin-wide cooperation and prevents conflicts.30 It 
could, therefore, encourage watercourse states at loggerheads on shared water resources 
to have recourse to it. 
  
For the Nile basin this could be a sort of warning in the sense that the business can no 
longer be done as usual and that they take need to take into account the Convention of the 
international community, if they cannot work out and come up with their own agreement. 
Sticking to historic and acquired right to claim the water of basin does not have any place 
in the face of the Convention. This is because the Convention helped in clarifying and 
codifying the rules and principles of the regime applicable to international watercourses, 
which are in tandem with the existing practices of states. These are the rules and 
principles, substantive and procedural in nature, that could apply to any international 
watercourse and that the Nile basin is not an exception to them. The weight of the 
consensus with which the Convention was adopted will carry persuasive force and in this 
respect it, could encourage the Nile basin states to refer to it. The reason why Ethiopia 
abstained, during the voting process for the adoption of the Convention, was that it hoped 
that it might encourage negotiations to ensure reasonable utilization and promote 
cooperation31. Egypt also held that the Convention provides a set of principles and 
articles on the use of waters and also that it provides a basis for improved cooperation, in 
the spirit of full and mutual respect.32 As admitted by both Ethiopia and Egypt, the 
adoption of the Convention has persuasive force in reconsidering the status quo in the 
basin. 
  
Influence of the Draft and Final Texts of the Convention 
 
Before it was taken up, the draft convention had exerted its influence significantly on 
other international agreements over international waters, which include, among others, 
the Convention on the Protection and Use of Tran boundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes of 1992, the SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses Systems in 
SADC countries of 1995, the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Deveelopment of the Mekong River Basin of 1995, and the Protocol on Common Water 
Resources, concluded by Argentina and Chile, of 1997.33 Its influence is also evident 
after it was adopted as discerned from the 1999 Draft Protocol to the 1992 Convention on 
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31 . Press Release, supra note no. 22 
32 . Press Release, supra note no. 22 
33 . Eckstein, supra note no. 26, p. 89 
the Protection and Use of the Trans boundary Watercourses and International Lakes.34 
Furthermore, its weight can be gathered from an attempt made by the Nile Basin states to 
employ it, after it was adopted, as a guideline for the making of rules regulating the water 
of the Nile in the Nile Basin Initiative framework.35 The influence of the Convention on 
the cooperative schemes in the Nile basin is discussed in the last section of this article. 
  
Decision of the ICJ 
 
The International Court of Justice made reference to it in rendering decision over the 
Gabcikovo-Nagimaros Case, in which it affirmed that the principle of equitable use of 
water is a cardinal principle.36 The Court has attached importance to the principle of 
reasonable and equitable utilization and its decision is important in many respects in the 
filed of international watercourses. It explicitly referred to the Convention as an 
authoritative statement of the law of international watercourses and this is particularly 
remarkable, given the fact that the Convention was not ratified by a single state at the 
time the decision was rendered.37 The decision is also a landmark in the sense that it 
could influence the thinking of many disputants over international watercourses when 
they consider means for dispute settlement.38 This is in the sense that it influences 
disputing states to admit that the principle of reasonable and equitable utilization is the 
governing rule for the settlement of their disputes relating to shared water resources. In 
addition, a number of states recognized it as an authoritative statement of the fundamental 
principles of international water law.39 Regardless of when and whether it comes in force, 
it will continue to play an important role in the management of international 
watercourses.40 Thus, in case the Nile basin states refer their dispute on the uses of the 
water of the Nile to international tribunals, for instance the ICJ, the decision of the ICJ 
over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case has an important implication in hearing the 
disputes and rendering final decision. The decision has also repercussion in looking for 
lasting solutions through negotiations among the Nile basin states themselves since the 
interpretation of the principle of reasonable and equitable utilization by the Court can 
give guidance to the states searching for solutions. 
 
Absence of Comprehensive Legal Framework on the Utilization and Management of 
the Nile Water 
                                                 
34 . Ibid 
35 . Girma Amare, “Nile Waters-Hydrological Cooperation Vs. Hydro Politics”. Paper presented at the 
Eighth Nile 2002 Conference, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2000 p. 7 
36 .  L. G. J. Thompson,  “The ICJ and the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagimaros Project : The 
Implications for International Watercourses Law and International Environmental Law”, CEPMLP Online 
Journal, 1999. http ://www. dundee. ac. uk. /cepmlp/html/article 3-2 html. 
37 . Wouters, supra note no. 30, p. 327 
38 . Salmam, A. Salman, “International Watercourses: Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict”, In 
Salman A. Salman and De Chazournes (eds) International Watercourses: Enhancing Cooperation and 
Managing Conflict. World Bank Technical Paper. No 414, 1998, p. 170 
  
39.  Patricia Wouters,  “National and International Water Law: Achieving Equitable and Sustainable Use of 
Water Resources”, Water International, Vol. 25 No. 4, 2000, P.  503. 
 
40 . Ibid 
 In the absence of a legal framework, one cannot envisage the settlement of differences 
among the riparian states that are related to the use of shared water resources. The 
presence of a legal framework is an earmark and constitutes an important component of 
cooperation and contributes to the means of finding and reaching solutions to 
international watercourse problems and avoids potential conflicts on them.  
 
The Convention provides a starting point for the negotiation of agreements relating to 
specific watercourse, and in the absence of any applicable agreement, sets basic 
parameters governing the conduct of riparian states to the watercourse.41
  
Today, there is no sound legal framework acceptable to all Nile basin states. This is one 
of the unique traits of the basin. The absence of such agreement has become a panacea 
for ways that lead to cooperation. The valid agreements in place in the Nile basin such as 
the 1959 Agreement (between Egypt and Sudan) and the 1929 Agreement (between 
Egypt and Uganda) are bilateral ones, which approached the water utilization and 
management in a splintered manner. The agreements do not represent a practice to be 
adopted by states sharing water resources. The two lower riparian states are not even, at 
present, willing to get these agreements scratched. This may even undermine the efforts 
of the recently launched Nile Basin Initiative, which has been perceived by many as a 
promising start. 
 
 It is the lack of a basin-wide agreement and the current situation in the basin that urges 
one to look for a legal springboard that could address the problems in the basin. The UN 
Watercourse Convention could be a good base and provides the basin states with a 
foundation in terms of searching for a legal framework capable of resolving the problems. 
The Convention could be referred and applied to the Nile basin in order to look for a 
means to resolve the existing problems since the basin states are not in a position to forge 
an agreement binding them and set up cooperative scheme. In the absence of a 
comprehensive agreement, it is the principles of reasonable use, no harm rule and the 
duty to cooperate, which are enshrined in the Convention, that determine the limit to 
sovereignty, confers rights up on and imposes obligations on the Nile riparian states that 
are exhibiting conflicting interests. Hence, the Convention provides them with 
appropriate framework based on which they could negotiate and reach an agreement.  
 
 Provision of Rules and Principles 
  
The Convention contains some important substantive and procedural rules and principles 
on how to use and manage international watercourses. It incorporates, among other 
things, such principles and rules as reasonable and equitable use, no significant harm, 
duty to cooperate, etc. The importance of the Convention, in general and the principle of 
reasonable use and duty to cooperate, in particular, are underscored by the ICJ in its 
decision on the Danube Case, since the Court specifically made reference to Article 5 of 
the Convention in delivering its decision.  
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Where the substantive and procedural rules, which serve to level the playing, such as 
equitable use, prior notification of planned measures, exchange of information are 
missing, the opportunity for unilateral development and power politics is always 
present.42 The absence of a legal framework for the management of international water 
resources increases the likelihood of inequalities and adverse consequences leading, in 
the worst-case scenario, to serious international conflicts over water.43
 
On substantive side, the Convention puts all the basin states on a level playing field.44 
This permits each state to put forth its case based on all factors relevant to its particular 
needs.45  The procedural mechanisms provided by it are important, particularly, for states 
that share an international watercourse for which no agreement exists.46 When there is 
conflict of uses, the Convention provides rules, for instance Article 10, as to the 
relationships among different types of uses that give rise to such conflict. 
  
One of the unique features of the Nile basin is the absence of sound rules and principles 
on the uses, management and development of its resources. The basin is also 
characterized by the presence of a zero-sum game, which results in distrust, suspicion, 
and tension among the states sharing it.47  The use of the water by one riparian state, 
especially by the upper riparian state, is perceived by another, particularly the lower 
riparian states, as detrimental to their interest and the latter will lose out. Similarly, the 
insistence on the status quo, by the lower riparian states, deprives the upper riparian states 
of their right to use the water. Hence, the utilization, management, and development of 
the resources of the Nile basin are characterized by an uncoordinated approach. 
 
The Convention furnishes the basin states with the rules and principles of the game, 
which is a win- win one, for the reason that it gives due regard to the interest of all the 
riparian states and there is no state that will lose out by its application. It provides them 
with the basic rules and general architecture for using and managing the water. It also 
calls for an integrated management of international watercourses and this is against the 
unilateral uses and management that has been the trend so far. Thus, if the basin states 
embark on negotiations on the basis of the rules and principles of it, they will be in a 
better position to reverse the status quo and avert the potential extreme type of conflict, 
which might arise, as predicted by some authorities, in the basin in the absence of certain 
rules and principles governing the disputes.  This is because the Convention is, in the 
words of McCaffrey, a bit like a buffet, i.e. there is something in it for everyone, which 
means that no matter whether one adheres to the principle of equitable use or the no harm 
rule, one can claim a victory.48 Thus, the rules incorporated in the Convention could 
                                                 
42 . Wouters, supra note no. 39, p. 503 
43 . Ibid 
44 . Patricia W., Salman A. Salman, and P. Jones, year ??, “The Legal Response to the World’s Water 
Crisis: What Legacy From the Hague? What Future in Kyoto?”, year -?,  p. 8 
45 . Ibid 
46 . Ibid 
47 . Tesfaye Tafesse, The Nile Questions: Hydro politics, Legal Wrangling, Modus Vivendi and 
Perspectives, Transaction Publishers, USA, 2001, p. 3 
48 . Stephen McCaffrey, “International Water Law for the 21st Century: The Contribution of the UN 
[Watercourses] Convention”, 1999. http:// www. uwin.siu.edu/ucowr/updates/pdf/vol 18-A3.pdf. 
replace divergent approaches representing conflicting interests of upstream and 
downstream states by an approach that emphasizes fair allocation of waters and 
cooperative and comprehensive management that benefits all riparian states and this will 
ensure the efficient and sustainable use of the resource. 
  
It Serves a Framework for Future Agreement 
  
The Convention is put as a broad and framework agreement. Although general, it is 
useful in providing the constitutive foundation for a legal regime that could be used as a 
preliminary model for regional agreements.49  Its being a framework is important and has 
an additional benefit of providing greater stability and predictability.50 The framework 
nature aims at laying down the constitutive foundations for a legal regime and is then 
elaborated through additional treaty.51  As a framework agreement, it, therefore, provides 
basic principles and rules and procedures in the absence of watercourse agreement and 
the watercourse states can apply and adjust it through specific watercourse agreements to 
suit the conditions of individual watercourse and needs of the shared water concerned. 
  
It is the diversity characterizing individual watercourses and the subsequent difficulty in 
drafting general principles that will apply universally to all watercourses that urged the 
ILC to come up with a framework convention.52 This approach provides watercourse 
states with general principles and rules applicable to non-navigational uses of 
international waters and also provides guidelines for the negotiation of future 
agreements.53  
  
The Nile basin does not have a legal foundation on how to use the resources and deal 
with the problems among the riparian states. In the absence of such legal foundation, one 
could make recourse to the Convention, as a base for negotiation on how to address the 
problems in the basin. It is hoped, by the ILC, that the framework agreement will provide 
watercourse states with a firm common ground, as a base for future negotiations.54  The 
same could be said of the Nile basin and that it provides the riparian states with a good 
start for future negotiation. It can, therefore, serve, for instance, as a sufficient framework 
for present negotiations under the tutelage of the Nile Basin Initiative as well as for future 
negotiations. 
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 It Serves as a Guideline 
  
The Convention is a framework agreement and as such it provides general principles and 
rules that watercourse states could apply and adjust through specific water agreement. 
This arrangement enables it play a role in setting forth guidelines for future negotiations. 
The Statements of Understanding on Article 3 of the Convention states that it serves as a 
guideline for future watercourse agreement55. The watercourse states are, therefore, 
encouraged to consider its principles and rules while conducting negotiations for 
agreement on international watercourses. The Statement of Understanding was entirely 
based on the commentary of the Convention and is of equal importance as the 
commentary itself, because the Working Group’s aim was to elaborate it based on the 
commentary prepared by the ILC. The Convention is a gesture of goodwill and indicates 
a high level of dedication to resolving the question of international watercourses.56  It 
will help remove the misplaced suspicion of many states by providing a stable guideline 
and framework within which each basin could operate.57
  
For the Nile basin that is known for the absence of rational and sound rules on how to use 
and manage its resources, the Convention could serve as a guideline for the future 
negotiations that could be made by them. The substantive and procedural principles that 
could guide them are incorporated in the Convention. The importance of the Convention 
being in Framework was underscored by, for instance, Egypt and Ethiopia. The statement 
made by the Egypt’s representative at the adoption of the Convention at the General 
Assembly and the comment and observation of Ethiopia submitted to the General 
Assembly before the Working Group assumed its task indicate that they endorsed this 
nature of the Convention and that this is important for the utilization and management of 
shared water resources.58
  
Its Flexibility 
  
The Convention determines the legal entitlement to use the waters of international 
watercourses through its principle of reasonable use. The mechanisms for determining 
legal entitlements are set forth in it, primarily, through its procedural rules of Article 8, 9, 
11-19, and 33.59 The process is supported by the provision requiring consultation and 
joint management.60 Where the issues of legal entitlement to water arise, the 
determination of what is reasonable and equitable is facilitated by the Convention, since 
it provides a broad, but non-exhaustive, factors to be considered to that effect under 
Article 6. Its procedural rules establish a framework within which states can operate, 
exchange information, provide prior notification of planned measures, establish joint 
management mechanism and this represents its strength.61 This makes it a flexible 
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instrument to govern legal entitlement, when supplemented by a comprehensive set of 
detailed procedural rules.62 Another provision that accords a flexible nature to it is 
Article 10, which provides that a use of water is not entitled to have preference over any 
other kind of use. All types of uses have equal weight when determining what a 
reasonable and equitable use is. All of them are considered on equal footing in arriving at 
reasonable use. The watercourse states could take into account any of the various factors, 
listed under Article 6, and achieve the principle. This encourages the watercourse states 
to apply the article in a flexible manner by avoiding the fact that there exists a pecking 
order in the types of the uses of water, with one having priority over another and also 
enables them to take into account conditions in their basin. 
 
Still another rule that makes the Convention flexible is found under its Article 3. States 
are free to “adjust the provisions” of the Convention to the particular characteristics of 
the watercourse concerned so long as the rights of other watercourse states are not 
affected by the Convention.63
 
In the Nile basin the allocation of water has so far been determined by historic and 
acquired rights, which does not accommodate the interest of all the riparian states. The 
legal entitlement to the water that is based on this right maintains the status quo and 
precludes the other states from having a share from the water.  The negotiations for the 
allocation or reallocation of the waters of the basin, for the purpose of achieving fairness, 
should be based on the consideration of all the relevant factors, such as the ones listed 
under Article 6 of the Convention and others are deemed relevant by the Nile basin states. 
The historic or existing use is merely one of the factors to be given credit and should not 
be a dominant one, for the Convention is, under Article 10, against the fact that historic 
use has inherent priority over the remaining uses and the same applies to the causing of 
harm to the existing use. Potential use by the upper riparian state is as important and of 
equal weight as the existing use. The claim of the upper riparian states for the reallocation 
of the water is addressed if negotiations are based on the principle of reasonable and 
equitable use for the reason that it is flexible and takes in to account a number of factors, 
which are not exhaustive, to that effect. When accompanied by the procedural rules of the 
Convention, a settled agreement is likely. 
  
Its Application on the Nile 
 
 Treaties and customary international law are important sources of international law 
under Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ. One needs to determine the relationship 
between them in instances whereby both at a time cover a certain rule.  The codification 
and incorporation of customary rule of international law in treaty does not serve as a bar 
to the application and operation of the customary rule. There is a possibility that they may 
function side by side, even if a treaty covers a rule provided by customary law. This is 
affirmed by the ICJ decision on the Nicaragua Case. In this Case the jurisdiction of the 
Court was excluded by treaty but it made the decision based on the customary rule of 
international law, the content of which was considered to be the same as that laid down in 
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the treaty.64  As to how a customary rule applies, despite the fact that is incorporated in 
treaty, the Court found out that principles such as those of the non use of force, non 
intervention, respect for the independence and territorial integrity of states and the 
freedom of navigation continue to be binding as part of customary international law, even 
if there are provisions of conventional law in which they are incorporated.65 Likewise, in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Denmark and the Netherlands claimed that 
Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention was binding Germany, a non-party to it, as 
a matter of customary international law.66 The ICJ reached the conclusion that Article 6 
of the Convention did not embody or crystallize the existing or emerging rule, but after 
the Convention came into force, the rule of Article 6 becomes a rule of customary 
international law and is binding on all states, owing partly because of its impact and 
partly on the basis of subsequent state practice.67 The decision affirms the fact that 
customary rule could apply and bind a state even if there is a treaty and a state may not be 
a party to it. The state is bound not by the treaty but by the operation of the rule of 
customary international law. Thus, from this decision, it means that a treaty does not 
deprive a customary rule of its existence and application, so long as the matter covered by 
both are identical. The incorporation of a customary rule in treaty serves, in such 
circumstances, as evidence of the existence of the customary rule.68  
 
The principle of reasonable and equitable utilization has attained the status of customary 
rule of international law.69 This assertion could be backed by the practices of states, 
which are found, mainly, in the treaties concluded by them and resolution of conflicts on 
the uses of water of international watercourses, the decisions of international and national 
tribunals over conflicts on uses of shared waters, and the writings of lawyers in this 
field.70 The Convention provides for the principle of reasonable use and what it tried in 
this respect was to codify a norm that has already attained the status of rule of customary 
international law. Hence, the Nile basin states are bound, in as far as this rule is 
concerned, as it amounts to a norm of international law in the field of shared water 
resources. The abstention of Ethiopia and Egypt during the voting for the adoption of the 
Convention does not mean that it does not govern the issues of water allocation, of the 
Nile, on the basis of the principle of reasonable and equitable utilization. This is because 
the acceptance of the principle as custom manifests the will of the international 
community at large and corresponds with the practices of states sharing water resources. 
It is these will that makes the established rules of customary international law binding on 
a new or existing states.71 Therefore, even if Ethiopia and Egypt are among the states that 
abstained during the voting process for the adoption of the Convention, they are bound by 
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the principle of reasonable and equitable use in sharing the waters of the Nile, not 
because they are party to the Convention, but because of customary rule. 
 
The codification of existing customary rule makes it a relevant instrument for the Nile 
basin, which is featured by the absence of a comprehensive set of rules and principles 
with respect to how to use, manage, and develop its resources. In the absence of such 
rules and principles, one could apply and make use of the rules and principles enshrined 
in the Convention. This is because its value-added rests mainly on its codification of 
customary international law rules of core interest to different group of states.72 So, the 
claims based on absolute territorial sovereignty and integrity and acquired and historic 
rights do not have a legal pedigree in the light of the principle of reasonable and equitable 
utilization, in particular, and the Convention, in general. The claims based on these 
theories should give way to the principle of reasonable and equitable use, which is 
customary rule and binds all states, since sticking to acquired and historical rights in 
order to claim entitlement to the waters of the Nile is in defiance to the spirit of the 
Convention, in general, and to the principle of reasonable and equitable use, in particular. 
 
When applied to the Nile basin states, the Convention’s terms effectively neutralize the 
previously competing rules as provided under Articles 5 and 7 since it places the two 
rules on equal footing.73 Hence, it divests each side, upper and lower riparian states, of 
persuasive legal arguments for the precedence of their claims.74 This urges both the up 
and lower riparian states to reexamine their ingrained positions and engage with one 
another to find fair solutions to their controversies.75 The support for such contention can 
be found in the voting at the General Assembly for the adoption of the Convention.76 The 
majority of the Nile basin states present during the adoption of the Convention abstained 
from voting for the Convention (Ethiopia, Egypt, Rwanda Tanzania); Burundi voted 
against it; Kenya and Sudan voted in favor of it; and Eritrea, Uganda and Democratic 
Republic of Congo were absent.77 The explanation for such voting is found, in part, in 
Articles 5 and 7 of the Convention that failed to maintain equilibrium properly between 
the two rules.78 If neither lower riparian states nor upper riparian states believed that the 
Convention adequately protected their apparently divergent claims, the Convention may 
have actually succeeded in negating the contending legal arguments.79 Thus, owing to the 
rules incorporated under Articles 5 and 7, neither side was left with any convincing way 
to uphold the legal priority of their positions.80 The factors to be taken into account in 
arriving at a reasonable and equitable utilization are provided under Article 6. Article 10 
provides that no priority is accorded to any use of water over the other.  As a result, 
sticking to historic uses and no harm on the one hand and absolute territorial sovereignty 
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on the other do not resolve problems hovering around the Nile basin. It is the taking in to 
account of different factors that could address the demands for fair partition of the water 
to the benefit of all riparian states and settle the problems. This demands cooperation, as 
provided under Article 9 of the Convention.  
 
Generally, the application of the rules of the Convention could contribute towards settling 
the quagmire in the Nile basin. This is because the rules embodied under Articles 5, 6, 7, 
and 10 of the Convention are useful in dissuading antagonistic claims and counter-claims 
and in encouraging accommodation of the interests of all riparian states in their bid to 
attain agreement. 
 
3. Influence of the Convention on the Cooperative Schemes in the Nile Basin 
 
The UN Watercourses Convention constitutes a milestone in the development of the law 
governing internationally shared water resources and that it will have significant bearing 
on states even if it does not enter into force.81 The success of the UN Watercourses 
Convention does not seem to depend on the ratification of it by the required number of 
states.82 Whether or not it enters into force, its influence is more likely to draw from its 
status as the most authoritative statement of general principles and rules governing the 
non-navigational uses of international watercourses.83 Even if it never enters into force, it 
already has generated considerable influence on states, which is apparent in the drafting 
of new agreements or the diplomatic negotiations between states regarding their shared 
watercourses.84 For instance, the drafters of the Southern African Development 
Community Protocol on Shared Watercourses have rewritten the Protocol to include the 
main provisions of the Convention.85 The influence of the Convention is evident in the 
1997 Draft Protocol to the 1992 UN/ECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Tranboundary Watercourses and International Lakes.86 One can also see the influence of 
the draft convention in the decision of the International Court of Justice over the 
Gabcikovo-Nagimaros Case involving Hungary and Slovakia over the Danube. In the 
Gabcikovo-Nagimaros case, the Court expressly referred to Article 5 of the Convention 
and held that the modern development of international law strengthened the principle for 
the non-navigational uses of international watercourses as evidenced by the adoption of 
the UN Watercourses Convention.87. 
 
The influence of the Convention is also visible in the Nile basin. The language of the Nile 
Basin Initiative appears to go after the lead of the UN Watercourses Convention in 
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drawing together the equitable utilization and no harm principles.88 The foundations of 
the Shared Vision and the Subsidiary Action Programs of the Nile Basin Initiative are the 
principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, no significant harm, cooperation in the 
management and development of the water of the Nile and its sustainable utilization.89 A 
concrete evidence of the influence on the Nile basin is to be found in the works being 
undertaken in the Cooperative Framework (Project D3) of the Nile Basin Initiative. This 
project comprises of three experts from riparian states and aims at providing support to 
the Nile basin states in defining an adequate and acceptable framework for cooperation 
that may pave the way for the equitable and legitimate uses of the Nile water.90 The 
experts made series of discussions on for the Framework Agreement on the basis of the 
principles of the UN Watercourses Convention. So far, no agreement has been reached. 
Making discussion for the Framework Agreement of Project D3 of the Nile Basin 
Initiative on the basis of the Convention indicates the extent of the pressure of the 
Convention on the Nile basin states. It is owing to this influence that Wiebe made 
prediction that the Nile Basin Initiative would most likely embrace the general principles 
of the existing Watercourses Convention.91 Her prediction was based on the fact that the 
Nile Basin Initiative launched Project D3, which is vested with the task of coming up 
with the legal framework regulating the utilization and management of the Nile water. 
 
The influence of the Convention on the Nile basin states came as a result of coincidence 
between the vote on the Convention in 1997 and the growing momentum in the work on 
the Nile Basin Initiative.92 It is the changes and improvements in the legal principles of 
entitlement to water, as embodied in the UN Watercourses Convention, that serves as one 
of the reasons for a new and more cooperative spirit in the Nile basin relationships, which 
culminated in the Nile Basin Initiative.93 Thus, the evolving normative framework for 
shared freshwater resources has helped to redefine both the identities and interests of key 
state actors in the Nile basin, moving them toward more cooperative conducts.94 It is, 
therefore, likely that the rules and principles, both substantive and procedural, of the UN 
Watercourses Convention affect, in one way or another, the attempts toward putting in 
place cooperative arrangements for the sharing and management of the water of the Nile. 
It is to be admitted, however, that the real effect of the terms of the Convention on such 
schemes will be elicited from the ultimate results of the ongoing discussions within the 
umbrella of the Nile Basin Initiative. 
 
Concluding Remark 
 
 
It is true actually that the principles and rules incorporated in the UN Watercourses 
Convention cannot, as they stand, conclusively resolve the problems enveloping the Nile 
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basin. They are rather subject to the degree to which the Nile basin states embrace the 
principles contained in the Convention. Thus, the Convention’s impact and effectiveness 
do not necessarily hinge on its ratification by the Nile basin states. If the Nile basin states 
show readiness and genuinely make use of it as foundation and guideline for their 
negotiations, it could contribute toward forging cooperative spirit in the Nile basin and 
thereby resolve the conflicts over the uses and management of the water of the Nile. This 
is made possible if they could arrive at a compromise on national interests and security 
concerns, de-politicize the issues of the Nile, and engage in dialogue in good faith with a 
view to addressing the water demands to the benefit of all the riparian states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
